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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LAURA LEE BLOXHAM FULLMER,
Case No.

Plaintiff-Respondent,

870499-CA

vs.
Category No. 7

BRIAN KEITH FULLMER,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION
The

Court

of

Appeals

has appellate jurisdiction over this

domestic relations matter pursuant to Utah

Code Annotated Section

78-2a-3(2)(g).
NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is

an appeal

from a

final order modifying a decree of

divorce in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Judge
presiding,

in

which

the

entered Decree of Divorce

lower
as

to

Boyd L. Park

court

modified

the previously

child

custody,

child support,

alimony and federal and state tax exemptions.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

Did the

trial court

been, since the time of the

err when it found that there had

decree, changes

in the circumstances

upon which the previous custody award was based?
1

II.

Was the court's finding that plaintiff-appellant's work

schedule, which necessitated the placement of the minor child in a
day care

center, a

sufficient substantial and material change of

circumstances to justify the reopening of the issue of custody?
III.

Does the remarrige of

time homemaker

constitute a

defendant-respondent to

material change

a full-

of circumstances to

justify reopening the question of custody?
IV.

Did the trial

material change

court

err

ir circumstances

in

its

determination

of a

which resulted in the reopening

the issue of custody?
V.
appropriate

Did

the

amount

trial
for

court

err

when

it

did

not

set an

plaintiff-appellant to pay to defendant-

respondent as child support?
VI.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in

failing to

terminate the previous award of alimony?
VII.

Did the

trial court

err when it awarded the 1987 and

1988 federal and state income tax exemption for the minor child to
defendant-respondent?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATE STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-5(3):
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes of new orders for the support and
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care,
or the distribution of the property as is reasonable and
necessary.

2

STATEMENT OF THg_gASg
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
final order

This is an appeal from a
divorce

entered

after

Petition to Modify a
Counter

Petition

Modify

of Divcrce

divojrce and plaintiff-appellant's

a

decree

Boyd t-

judicial District Court, Judge
the Pecree

decree of

a trial on defendant-respondent's Amended

decree of

to

modifying a

signed by

of divorce in the Fourth
Park presiding,

in which

Judge David Sam on February 19,

1985, was modified in regards to child custody, child support, and
tax exemptions.
B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.

The

original

decree

of

divorce in this matter was entered

pursuant to a "default divorce" in which defendant-respondent, who
was

unrepresented

by

plaintiff-appellant.
David Sam

counsel,

entered

Subsequently, on

into a stipulation with

February

19,

1985, Judge

of the Fourth Judicial District Court signed the decree

of divorce, which became final three months later on May 19, 1985.
(R.

22

through

23)

The

decree of divorce awarded plaintiff-

appellant custody of the minor child, but the findings of
support of

said decree

fit and proper person

fact in

did not designate either party as being a

to be

awarded the

and control of the minor child.

permanent care, custody

Child support was set at $150 per

montH/ and alimony was set at $200 pejr month.
exemptions was not addressed.
3

The issue

of tax

A petition to modify decree of divorce was filed in September
of 1986 by defendant-respondent in which

he requested

custody

Subsequently, defendant-

be

awarded

to

him.

(R.

28)

that child

respondent filed an amended petition to modify in February of 1987
requesting termination

of alimony and award to him of the federal

and state income tax exemptions for
Plaintiff-appellant filed
divorce

in

support.

October
(R. 49)

of

a counter
1986

minor

child.

petition to modify decree of

requesting

an

increase

in child

L.

Park

of

the

Fourth

Judicial District

(R. 183)

C.

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW.

After

hearing

the

proffered

evidence

reviewing the child custody evaluation performed
of

(R. 62)

Trial was held on October 13, 1987 before the

Honorable Judge Boyd
Court.

the

Child

Custody

Evaluation

of

counsel,

and

by Bert Peterson

Services, Judge Boyd L. Park found

that there had been a material change of circumstances with regard
to child

custody which

issue, and
custody.
Judge

that

he

was sufficient

was

entitled

After reviewing

Park

awarded

for reopening the custody

to

reconsider

the evidence

custody

of

the

the

issue of

and proffered testimony,

minor

child,

Dagin,

to

defendant-respondent.
Findings

fact

and

conclusions of law were subsequently

entered by the court on

the

10th

relation

to

of

material

change

of
4

day

of

November,

circumstances

with

1987.

In

regard to

custody, the court stated as follows:
a) "That since

the

entry

defendant on

September 28,

marriage

the

to

present

of

the

"That at

of

divorce, the

1985 married Lynda Fullmer.
Mrs.

Fullmer

environment for the rearing of Dagin."
b)

decree

has

created

That the
a

stable

(R. 194)

the time of the entry of the decree of divorce

in this matter, the plaintiff was working on a part-time basis and
attended school from one to four hours a day."
c)

"That

the

enabled her to spend

part-time

work

considerable

(R. 194)

schedule

time

with

of the plaintiff
the

minor child."

(R. 194)
d)

"That in August, 1987, the plaintiff has become gainfully

employed on
day.

That

a full-time
during

basis working

such

time

at least

eight hours per

as she is working on a full-time

basis, the child has been placed in a day care center."
e)
for that

"That subsequent to the
period of

entry of

time beginning

the decree

(R. 194)
of divorce

in May of 1985 and continuing

through the beginning of the summer of 1986, the defendant, at the
request

of

the

plaintiff,

significant period of time.
needed

assistance

with

child to the father."
Having
circumstances

found

had

the

From

the

care

child

time to

visiting with him a
time when

the mother

of the child, she brought the

(R. 194, 195)

that

justifying

there
the

had

been

court's

5

a

material

reopening

change of

of the custody

issue, the court awarded
child, with

the parties

defendant-respondent to

joint custody
be given

the physical care,

custody and control of the minor child, subject
year, October

to review

13., 1988, at the hour of 9:00 a.m.

minor child,

took into consideration the following factors:

caretaker, time availability,

stability

of

the

in one

(R. 195, 196)

In determining what was in the best interests of the
the court

of the minor

primary

environment and

relationship to step-parent and step-sibling.

(R. 198,199)

determining all relevant factors, the

concluded

best interests

of the

child would

his father, defendant-respondent.
court ordered

court

After

that the

be best served by living with
(R.

defendant-respondent to

318)

In

addition, the

pay to plaintiff-appellant

the sum of $250 per month as child support during the three summer
visitation

months

which

she

would

197), and awarded defendant-respondent

have custody (R.196 through
the 1987

and 1988 federal

and state income tax exemptions for the minor child (R. 321).
D.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS.

Plaintiff-appellant and

defendant-respondent w€*re married on

November 22, 1980 in Salt Lake City, Utah.
issue of
19, 1983.
1984.

this marriage,

to wit:

One child was

born as

Dagin Lester Fullmer, born May

Plaintiff-appellant filed her complaint in September of

On October 5, 1984, the parties entered into a stipulation

where both parties agreed that plaintiff-appellant
proper person

to care

was a

fit and

for the physical needs and emotional needs
6

of

the

child.

Stipulation,

During

no

was

provision

support in the amount
conclusions of

was

filed

on

regarding

of $150

pursuant

to

said

unrepresented by counsel.
February

custody,

per month.

19,

but

1985, which

does set child

Findings

of fact and

law were signed on the 19th day of February, 1985,

in which plaintiff-appellant
child, Dagin.

The

proper person

to be

they do

negotiations

defendant-respondent

An amended stipulation
contained

all

was

findings do

awarded

of

care, custody

and discuss

and control, but

child support.

The decree of

divorce also signed the 19th day of February, 1985, does
any particular

the minor

not find anybody to be a fit and

awarded the

award custody

custody

findings but simply awards custody.

not make

(R. 1 through

23)
Prior

to

the

plaintiff-appellant
the minor child.
child was

implementation

of

fulfilled

role of primary caretaker for

the

the

decree

divorce,

Defendant had standard visitation, but the minor

cared for and dwelled with his mother.

implementation of the
materially changed

of

summer

visitation

where, rather

for

Then, after the

1985,

the pattern

than plaintiff-appellant as the

custodial parent, defendant-respondent had the child residing with
him, and

in fact cared for him for three-fourths of the time. (R.

256 through 280)
Subsequent to the

finalization

defendant-respondent remarried

of

and has
7

the

decree

of divorce,

had a child.

The current

Mrs, Fullmer tended the minor child

subsequent to

the remarriage

for three to ten hours a day, six to seven days a week, (R. 256)
Defendant-respondent filed a petition to modify the decree of
divorce in September of

1986, requesting

custody over the parties1 minor child.
petition to modify
had informed

was

precipitated

(R. 28)

be given child

The filing of the

because plaintiff-appellant

defendant-respondent that she had decided to move to

New York City, New York where she was
career.

that he

In addition,

going to

pursue a modeling

she informed defendant-respondent that she

would be living there with a boyfriend and another male individual
and that

she was taking the minor child of the parties to live in

that environment.

(R. 259)

amended

to

petition

Defendant-respondent later

modify

in

February

modification of the decree regarding
federal tax

exemptions.

counter petition

to

(R. 62)

modify

increase in child support.

in

alimony

filed his

of 1987, requesting
and

the

state and

Plaintiff-appellant filed the

October

of

1986

requesting an

(R. 49)

Trial was held before the Honorable Judge Boyd L. Park of the
Fourth Judicial District Court on

October

13,

1987.

(R. 183)

After hearing the proffered testimony, Judge Park ruled that there
had been a material

change of

circumstances since

the decree of

divorce, that defendant-respondent should be awarded the permanent
care, custody and control of the minor child of the
child support

during the

parties, that

three summer months in which plaintiff8

appellant had visitation should
and that

be increased

defendant-respondent should

to $250

per month;

be entitled to the 1987 and

1988 federal and state income tax exemptions for

the minor child.

(R. 315 through 326)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Judge Boyd

L. Park of the Fourth Judicial District Court did

not abuse his discretion when
material

change

of

he

found

circumstances,

that

sufficient

purposes of reopening the custody issue.
divorce

was

entered

pursuant

which defendant-respondent
findings of

fact and

person

to

was

testimony

awarded

at

the

and material for

the

by

law signed
party as

permanent

control of the miner child of the parties.
proffered

been a

original decree of

unrepresented

conclusions of

be

The

had

to a "no-contest type" divorce in

Divorce Decree do not designate either
proper

there

counsel.

The

in the original
being a

fit and

care, custody and

Defendant-respondent's

hearing regarding change of custody

stated that when h€ signed the stipulation he anticipated that the
minor

child

would

live

with

his

respondent would have visitation.
the decree
with

him

custodial

of divorce,
three-fourths
parent

for

mother,

and that defendant-

That subsequent to the entry of

defendant-respondent had
of
the

appellant began working on

the

time

and

minor child.
a full-time

in

fact

became the

In addition, plaintiff-

basis, thus

time availability to spend with the minor child.
9

the minor child

reducing her

After

having

found

there

existed

circumstances sufficient to justify
the

court

correctly

decided

de

would be in the best interests
court

took

into

material

reopening the

change

of

custody issue,

novo which custody arrangement

of the

consideration

a

child.

In doing

function-related

so, the

factors,

i.e.

primary caretaker, time availability, stability of the environment
and relationship

to step-parent and step-sibling.

relied heavily on a child custody

The court also

evaluation report

submitted by

Bert Peterson,

LCSW of Child Custody Evaluation Services, wherein

he recommended

that

custody

of

the

minor

child

be

given to

defendant-respondent.
Once

deciding

that

defendant-respondent

appropriate person to be awarded the
control of

the minor

child, the

would

permanent care,

court failed

be

the

custody and

to enter an order

requiring plaintiff-appellant to pay to defendant-respondent child
support, based
parties.
pay to

on her

ability to pay, for the minor child of the

Instead, the trial court ordered defendant-respondent to

plaintiff-appellant $250

a month in child support for the

three summer months that she would have visitation
child.

However,

in

light

of

its

order requiring defendant-

respondent to pay child support for the three
did

not

have

the

minor

child

residing

correctly awarded defendant-respondent the
tax

exemptions.

The

court's
10

with the minor

reasoning

months in

with
1987

him,
and

which he
the court

1988 income

for increase in child

support was based on creating a greater stream
child,

and

said

award

of income

for the

was justifiably within the trial court's

discretion.

ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT FOUND THAT
THERE HAD BEEN, SINCE THE TIME OF THE DECREE CHANGES IN
THE CIRCUMSTANCES UPON WHICH THE PREVIOUS CUSTODY AWARD
WAS BASED.
Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah, 1982) adopted a bifurcated
procedure for petitions to modify decrees of divorce in regards to
child custody.

Pursuant to said procedure outlined in Hogge, the

court first must make a determination that a substantial change of
circumstances

has

occurred

issue of child custody.
change in

If

circumstances has

warranting

the

the court

finds that

taken place

decree of divorce, the court may

court to reopen the

since the

"determine denovo

a substantial
entry of the
which custody

arrangement will serve the welfare or best interests of the child,
and modify, or refuse to modify, the decree accordingly."

Jd. at

54.
It

is

evidence to
first

making

true

that

the court
opening

circumstances in
court acknowledged

the

attorneys

in accordance
statements

regards to

for the parties presented

with the

Hogge analysis by

regarding a material change of

child custody.

(R. 254, 260). The

the bifurcated process as articulated in Hogge

and expressed its familiarity with all of the cases that
11

had been

cited

by

both

counsel

(R.

315).

As such, the court was also

expressing its familiarity with Moody v. Moody, 715 P. 2 507 (Utah,
1985),

which

held

that

the

court

evaluation reports for purposes
regarding substantial
Id. at 509

may

receive

of making

child custody

its threshold decision

changes in circumstances pursuant to Hogge.

(R. 298).

Plaintiff-appellant takes issue with the fact
allowed

counsel

for

defendant-respondent to commence presenting

evidence on all issues

in

regarding

change

substantial

procedure as enumerated in
implement

at

the

trial

presented with regard to
trial

denovo

regarding
problems

is

material
with

also

the

case
of

in

step 2

to

to

Hogge is
that

of the

relevant
of

prior

making

circumstances.

Hogge v.
level

change

regard

that the court

much

a ruling

The bifurcated

often difficult to
of

the evidence

Hogge analysis regarding

to step 1 of the Hogge analysis

circumstances.

The

practical

the Hogge analysis were articulated by

District Court Judge Daniels in his concurring opinion in Moody v.
Moody as follows:
The problem with the procedure is this: the evidence
supporting changed circumstances is almost always the
same evidence that is used to establish the best
interests of the child. Even when there is additional
evidence which
bears solely on the best interest
guestion, that evidence is usually so entwined with the
changed circumstances
evidence that
it is almost
impossible to sort out. The trial judge is faced with
an objection to almost every guestion. He or she must
then try to figure out whether the answer would relate
to changed circumstances, best interests or both. The
witness freguently must be recalled to give further
12

testimony in the second phase of the hearing, which
causes inconvenience for the witness and expense for the
parties.
Admittedly, some trial judges do not follow this
cumbersome procedure.
Instead, we take all of the
evidence and sort out mentally that which relates to
changed circumstances and that which relates to best
interests. We then make findings on both issues, taking
into consideration the important policy of custodial
stability, which requires a very high standard to
establish a material change in circumstances.
Id. at
511.
Consequently, the trial court

did

not

err

with

regard to

listening to the entire evidence in the matter prior to entering a
ruling regarding

whether

or

not

there

had

been

a

change of

circumstances sufficient to warrant reopening of the child custody
issue.

Indeed, the court was

justified

in

hearing

all

of the

evidence, including the child custody evaluation submitted by Bert
Peterson, LCSW, in making this
there were

changes in

determination

circumstances that

of

whether

or not

justified reopening of

the child custody issue.
In

finding

circumstances
court made its
following:

that

for

there

purposes

findings

of

had
of

been

material

change

of

reopening the custody issue, the

fact, which

includes

some

of the

that at the time of the entry of the decree of divorce

in this matter, plaintiff-appellant
basis and

a

attending school

was

from one

working

on .a part-time

to four hours per day; that

said part-time work schedule of plaintiff-appellant enabled her to
spend considerable

time with

the minor
13

child; that in August of

1987, plaintiff-appellant began
minor

child

to

be

placed

subsequent to the decree
minor child

working

full-time

full-time in a day care center; that

of divorce

defendant-respondent had the

visiting with him a significant period of time at the

request of plaintiff-appellant. (R. 194,195)
cited

reasons

were

part

of

the

material change in circumstances
custody issue.
had

based

requiring the

its

All

of

the above

basis for the court finding a

for

purposes

of

reopening the

The court then articulated in its findings that it
decision

on

finding

a

material

change

of

circumstances primarily because of two of the reasons above cited,
to wit:
a. The change in plaintiff's work schedule to full-time
employment necessitating the placement of the minor
child, Dagin, in a day care center also on a full-time
basis.
b. The remarriage of defendant and his creation thereby
of a stable home environment where the child can be
cared for by a stepmother who is a homemaker, not
working outside the home, during those times when the
father is working. (R. 195)
The

complaint

plaintiff-appellant
divorce, the

in
and

the

original divorce action was filed by

her

attorney.

plaintiff-appellant did

In

the

complaint for

not pray for custody of the

minor child (R. 1,2). Defendant-respondent being unrepresented by
counsel, entered

into a

her attorney shortly
amended Stipulation

stipulation with plaintiff-appellant and

after

the

divorce

was subsequently

was

(R.8).

An

entered into by the parties

on February 13, 1985 in which neither party
14

filed

was awarded custody—

the only

allusion being

an award

per month in child support.

to plaintiff-appellant of $150

(R. 10-12)

Wherefore, findings of

fact, conclusions cf law and a decree of divorce were duly entered
granting to plaintiff-appellant custody of the minor child without
any designation

whatsoever or finding by the trial court that she

was a fit and proper person
custody and

control of

to

be

the minor

awarded

permanent care,

permanent care,

child. (R. 18 through 23)

only reference to plaintiff-appellant being
awarded the

the

a

fit

person

The

to be

custody and control of the child was

the original stipulation entered

into between

the parties, which

could have arguably been superseded by the Amended Stipulation.
Since the trial court in the original divorce made no finding
regarding whether either party was a fit person to be

awarded the

permanent care, custody and control of the minor child, defendantrespondent's testimony regarding

his

stipulations

Defendant-respondent's proffered

becoires

relevant.

intent

testimony at the hearing regarding change
when he

had signed

his mother,

of

divorce,

availability to

care for

the day.

stated that

(R.

In addition, at the time of

plaintiff-appellant
the minor

part-time and could care for
portion of

of custody

and defendant-respondent would

have visitation. (R. 256 through 259)
decree

executing the

the stipulation he anticipated that the minor

child would live with

the

when

the

15

more

time

child since she was employed

child

259, 260)

had

personally

for

a great

The proffered testimony of

defendant-respondent was made part of the findings of

fact of the

court wherein it stated as follows:
4.
That at the time of the entry of the decree of
divorce in this matter, the plaintiff was working on a
part-time basis and attending school from one to four
hours per day.
5. That the part-time work schedule of the plaintiff
enabled her to spend considerable time with the minor
child.
6. That in August, 1987, the plaintiff has become
gainfully employed on a full-time basis working at least
eight hours per day, that during such time as she is
working on a full-time basis, the child has been placed
in a day care center.
7. That subsequent to the entry of the decree of
divorce and for the period of time beginning in May of
1985 and continuing through the beginning of the summer
of 1986, the defendant, at the request of plaintiff had
the child visiting with him a significant period of
time.
From time to time when the mother needed
assistance with the care of the child, she brought the
child to the father. (R. 194 & 195)
The findings of fact
District Court

show that

as articulated

Fourth Judicial

there are sufficient justifications for

the court's decision that there
circumstances upon

by the

which the

had

been

a

previous award

material

change of

of custody had been

based.
II. THE COURT'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S
WORK SCHEDULE NECESSITATED THE PLACEMENT OF THE MINOR
CHILD IN
A DAY
CARE CENTER
WAS A SUFFICIENTLY
SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES TO
JUSTIFY REOPENING THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY.
In the case of

Marchant v.

Marchant, 66

Utah Adv.

Rpt. 45

(September 18, 1987), this court quoted Rule 52a of the Utah Rules
16

of Civil Procedure to state that
set aside

unless clearly

findings of

fact "shall

eroneous, and due regard shall be given

to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
the witness,"

Id.

credibility of

at 47. However, in the case of child custody

awards this court articulated standards for findings of
trial

court

in

not be

child

fact of a

custody cases, and stated that sufficient

findings:
1. Are sufficiently detailed;
2. Including enough facts to disclose the process
through which the ultimate conclusion is reached;
3. Indicate
the process
is logical and properly
supported; and
4. Are not clearly eroneous. Id. at 47.

In

setting

considered by
the

court

in

the

standard

a trial
Marchant

previously outlined

court in

for

the

v. Pusey,

1986) and stated that child custody
findings regarding

factors

are

factors

that

had been

728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah,

decisions should

be based on

"function related factors" and articulated the

following list to be considered by a trial court: 1)
tity of

properly

determining an award of custody,

reiterated

in Pusey

what

the primary

caretaker" Id.

47; 2)

"The iden-

"The identity of the

parent with a greater flexibility to provide personal care for the
child" Id.

at 47; 3) "The

identity of

child

spent

his

has

determination if

most

of

or

her

the parent with whom the
time

pending

custody

that period has been lengthy" Id. at 47; 4) "The

stability of the environment provided by each parent".
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The Fourth Judicial District

Court in

its Findings

of Fact

regarding material change of circumstances stated as follows:
4.
That at the time of the entry of the decree of
divorce in this matter, the plaintiff was working on a
part-time basis and attending school from time to time.
5.
That the part-time work schedule of the plaintiff
enabled her to spend considerable time with the minor
child.
6.
That the plaintiff has become gainfully employed on
a full-time basis working at least 8 hours per day.
That during such time as she is working on a full-time
basis, the child has been placed in a day care center.
7. That subsequent to the entry of the decree of
divorce and for that period of the time beginning in May
of 1985 and continuing through the beginning of the
summer of 1986, the defendant, at the request of the
plaintiff had the child visiting with him a significant
period of time.
From time to time when the mother
needed assistance with the care of the child, she
brought the child to the father. (R. 194, 195)
The above

stated findings are sufficiently detailed in order

to satisfy the requirements
findings indicate

that at

set forth

in Marchant.

Indeed, the

the time of the divorce, plaintiff was

working part-time and attending school from time to time, and thus
she had

a great deal more time to spend with the minor child than

defendant who was working full-time at Wicatt.
decree

of

divorce,

and as a result,
child was

Subsequent to the

plaintiff-appellant began working full-time;

her time

availability to

substantially reduced.

appellant's busy working schedule,

Indeed,
social

spend with

the minor

because of plaintiffschedule

and vacation

scheduler she did not have sufficient time to spend with the minor
18

child when he was ill, and would bring the minor child to be cared
for

by

defendant-respondent

on

Because of plaintiff-appellant's
roles, and

those

occasions. (R. 256, 257)

schedule,

defendant-respondent, became

the minor child.

(R. 257)

court articulated

It

the

parties reversed

the primary caretaker of

is based

on these

its findings as above stated.

facts that the

The findings are

based on sufficient factual testimony and evidence and

should not

be set aside.
III. IN THE PRESENT FACT SITUATION, THE REMARRIAGE
OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
TO
A
FULL-TIME HOMEMAKER
CONSTITUTED A
MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES TO
JUSTIFY REOPENING THE QUESTION OF CUSTODY.
Plaintiff-appellant relies on the

case of

Kramer v. Kramer,

738 P.2d 624 (Utah, 1987) for her proposition that the trial court
erred in considering defendant-respondent's current marriage
full-time homemaker
purposes of

to be

reopening

a substantial

the

custody

to a

and material change for

issue.

Plaintiff-appellant

argues that the fact situation in the present case is identical to
that in Kramer in which the trial court
parent

only

in

determining

change of circumstances
issue.

The trial

for

court in

whether

focused on
there

purposes

of

child

to

problems

Hogge, wherein
the
and

the court

noncustodial
could

provide

had been a material

reopening

the custody

that case held that the noncustodial

parent in Kramer did not fall within the
Hogge v.

the custodial

mother
a
19

exception articulated in

changed custody
who

stable

had

of the minor

overcome emotional

home environment for her

children.
However,
decision

but

Kramer
only

was

to

not

limit

intended
its

wherein the trial court felt that

to

overrule

the Hogge

application to a circumstance

the original

decree of divorce

was based on circumstances regarding the noncustodial parent.
court indicated

in Kramer

that it

was not

The

overruling the Hogge

decision but merely limiting its application:
The narrow construction we place on Hogge is not an
innovation or change in our case law.
Rather it is
consistent with the approach this court has implicitly
taken in applying the first prong of Hogge's change of
custody test. Kramer, Id. at 627.
Nevertheless, the
weighing the evidence,

trial court

in Kramer,

ruled

the

that

after hearing and

noncustodial

parent had

failed to carry the burden of material change in circumstances for
purposes of reopening the custody issue. As such, the Kramer case
can easily

be distinguished from the present case now before this

court in which the trial judge ruled that
had indeed

the noncustodial parent

met his burden of proof in showing that there had been

a material and substantial change of circumstances in
the

issue

of

child

custody

since

the

time

relation to

of the decree of

divorce.
Indeed, the ccurt in Kramer indicated

that it

was the trial

court, and not the appellate court, who should weigh the presented
evidence in order to determine whether or not a material change in
circumstances has been met:
20

It is the trial court's prerogative to hear and weigh
the conflicting evidence and to make findings of fact.
We will not upset such findings when they are supported
by substantiated record evidence. Kramer, Id. at 628.
In the
to

rebut

present case,

the

evidence

ruling of Judge

Park

although plaintiff-appellant attempted

presented

indicates

by

that

defendant-respondent, the
in

evidence presented

by the

that presented

defendant-respondent.

by

acknowledge the

she

had

the relative

parties, that he was more persuaded by
The

court's findings

fact that since the decree of divorce, plaintiff-

appellant had spent substantially less time
than

weighing

at

the

time

with the

of the decree.

minor child

In fact, plaintiff-

appellant herself had chosen defendant-respondent and his new wife
to be

the caretaker of the minor child when she went on Caribbean

cruises, (R. 257), when the child was sick

(R. 257), and when she

was involved in career pursuits (R. 256, 257).
Indeed,

since

defendant-respondent's

remarriage to a full-

time homemaker, defendant-respondent and his new wife, Lynda, have
had

Dagin

in

their

home for approximately three-fourths of the

time between May of 1985 through
1986.

(R. 256,

child with

with

so

attention.
the trial

pox

of the

summer of

257). Indeed, plaintiff-appellant herself chose

to leave the minor
chicken

the beginning

(R. 257)

that

his step-mother

enter a finding regarding

was sick

he would receive the proper care and

Based on the

court's discretion

when he

evidence presented,

to determine

it was in

that it was proper to

defendant-respondent's remarriage
21

to a

full-time homemaker since it was she who had in fact spent a great
deal of time subsequent to the

entry

of

the

decree

of divorce

caring for the miner child of the parties to this action.
Of particular significance in the Kramer decision is the fact
that three of the Supreme Court justices merely concurred in Judge
Zimmerman's
Justice

opinion,

Stewart,

opinions of

to

and

wit:

Justice Durham, Associate Chief

Justice

Justice Stewart

Howe.

The

and Justice

written

Howe indicate that they

held some reservations in regards to the court's
to a

standard which

allows the

custodial parent ir determining
material and

concurring

strict adherence

trial court to focus only on the
whether or

substantial circumstances

not there

has been a

for purposes of reopening

the custody issue.
Associate Chief Justice Stewart stated:
The nature of the parent-child relationship may never be
discovered by the trial judge if he or she rigidly
limits a hearing for a change in custody to determine
whether there are changed circumstances, without any
regard for how well the child is doing under the
established custody relationship.
Focusing only on
alleged change of circumstances of one or the other of
the parents may result in great harm to a child.
Kramer, Id. at 628.
Justice Stewart felt that
stability is
severed
principle

from
of

the

court's

"strong

emphasis on

reaching a point where it has become inappropriately
the

underlying

stability

reason

itself,

custody awards are in the best

i.e.

that
the

interests of
22

supports
need

the

very

to insure that

the child involved."

Kramer, Id. at 629.
Justice Howe

agreed with

Justice Stewart and further stated

his concern regarding a decree
which the

court had

of

divorce

not entertained

based

the evidence

on

default in

and entered a

ruling on what would be in the best interests of the child:
I have somewhat of the same concern in cases where
divorce decree and custody of a child is obtained by
default.
In such instances there is no determination
made by the court as to which parent would be superior
in raising the child. Too rigid an application of the
rule advocated by the majority would forever lock a
child into the custody of one parent or the other where
there has been no determination on the merits of
parenting ability of either parent and custody has been
awarded only because of the default of one parent in
failing to oppose the complaint of the other.
A child
should not be subjected to spending the rest of his or
her minority in a inferior environment because of the
inaction of one parent at the time custody is awarded.
Kramer, Id. at 629.
This is certainly the
defendant-respondent,
entered

into

attorney in

a

case

who

was

stipulation

the original

in

the

present

unrepresented

with

to who

by counsel, merely

plaintiff-appellant

action for divorce.

no determination with regard

action wherein

would be

and

her

The court had made
the best custodial

parent, and in fact, the court did not enter a finding determining
plaintiff-appellant to
determination

was

be a

made,

the

"fit and

proper person".

Since no

actions and intents of the parties

become relevant.
In the present case, defendant-respondent, in
testimony, indicated

his proffered

that at the time of the decree of divorce he
23

anticipated plaintiff-appellant having a
spend with

the child,

great deal

more time to

and acting as custodial parent.

Since the

decree of divorce, defendant-respondent had in fact had

the child

three-fourths

of

the

time, which

original decree of divorce, and had
parent of

the minor

was

in fact

work-

Judge Park

as so

the

become the custodial

when defendant-respondent

acknowledged the

that the minor child had spent
current wife,

in

child, along with his new spouse, Lynda, who

had cared for the child during the days
was at

unanticipated

great amount of time

with defendant-respondent

and his

articulated in Finding No. 7 of his Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Laws, which states:
That subsequent to the entry of the decree of
divorce and for that period of time beginning in
May of 1985 and continuing through the beginning of
the Summer of 1986, the defendant, at the request
of plaintiff had the child visiting with him a
significant period of time. From time to time when
the mother needed assistance with the care of the
child, she brought the child to the father. (R.
194, 195)
In this circumstance, the court in Finding 9b

of its

Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law made a determination that:
The remarriage
of defendant and his creation
thereby of a stable home environment where the
child can be cared for by a stepmother who is a
homemaker, not working outside the home, during
those times when the father is working, (R. 195)
constituted a
custody issue.

material change

of circumstances for reopening the

Said determination of the court

was based

on the

evidence and on the fact that defendant-respondent and his present
24

wife had

in fact

already had

assumed much of the responsibility

attendant to being a primary caretaker to the minor child, Dagin:
The fact that the father had the child all of these days
during that period of time in my opinion is not "knit
picky". I think that was part of my consideration.
If
this had been a situation where the father had never had
the child so that here we are putting the child over in
a brand new environment something that would be strange
to a child, at this point in time, that would been a
futher consideration of mine. (R. 337)
IV.
AFTER DETERMINING THAT THERE HAD BEEN A
MATERIAL CHANGE
IN CIRCUMSTANCES
FOR PURPOSES OF
CHANGING CUSTODY,
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN
REOPENING THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY AND DETERMINING WHAT WAS
IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD.
Once the

trial court

has determined

that there

substantial and material change in circumstances

has been a

for purposes for

modifying the decree of divorce regarding child custody, the court
"must determine
welfare or

denovo which

best interests

custody arrangement

will serve the

of the child, and modify, or refuse to

modify, the decree accordingly."

Hogge, Id. at 54.

In Marchant v. Marchant, 66 Utah Adv. Rpt.

45 (September 18,

1987) this court adopted the standards to be considered by a trial
court in child custody cases to be "function-related factors", and
adopted the

standards as earlier set forth in Pusey v. Pusey, 728

P.2d 117 (Utah, 1986) as follows:
1. The identity of the primary caretaker during the
marriage.
2.
The identity of the parent with greater flexibility
to provide personal care for the child,
3. The identity of the parent with whom the child has
spent most
of his
or her
time pending custody
25

determination if that time has been lengthy, and
4.
The stability of the environment provided by each
parent. Marchant, Id. at 47.
In the present
after first
had

taken

case,

the

determining that
place

appropriate factors

regarding

Fourth

Judicial

a material
custody,

as enunciated

District Court,

change of circumstances

entertained

all

of

in Pusey v. Pusey and Marchant

v. Marchant and articulated in Finding No. 18

of its

Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows:
The court having determined that there exists a material
change in circumstance, finds it necessary to determine
what is in the best interests of the minor child.
Therefore, the court takes
into consideration the
following:
a.
Primary Caretaker.
Although the plaintiff has
technically been the primary custodian of Dagin, it is
not easy to determine whether or not she has been the
constant primary caretaker. The court notes Exhibit "1"
of plainitff (sic) delineating actual custody time
periods.
b. Time Available. The court finds that there has been
a material
change in the time available for the
plaintiff to spend with the minor child, both parents
now working
full-time as
opposed to the earlier
situation.
c. Stability of the Environment.
The court finds
significant changes in environment and goals of the
plaintiff and further notes a considerable degree of
stability of environment in the defendant.
d.
Relationship to stepparent and step-sibling. The
court finds that the day care center in which the child
is presently
enrolled appears to be an excellent
facility, well staffed with state of the art technology.
The court further finds that the stepmother, Lynda
Fullmer, has developed an excellent loving relationship
with the minor child and will be available as a
homemaker in the home at times needed by the child. The
26

the

court further finds that the minor child has seemed to
develop an excellent appropriate relationship with his
stepsister, Christa. (R. 198, 199)
The trial

court also

placed a considerable amount of weight

on the child custody evaluation conducted
of

Child

Custody

Evaluation

custody of Dagin be

given

by Bert

Services

to

which

Petersen, LCSW

recommended

defendant-respondent.

that

The court

noted in Finding Nc. 20 of its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, "the court finds that it is in agreement with

the conclusion

of Mr. Petersen as contained in his report." (R. 200)
In

his

report,

Mr.

determining what would be

Peterson
in

the

looked
best

at

ten

interests

factors
of

in

the minor

child, to wit: primary caretaker, time available, integration into
the family,

stability

interference with

of

environment,

religious training,

visitation, frequent changes of residence, move

out of state, relationship
support system.

the

In

to

stepparent

and

particular, Mr. Peterson noted that within a

ten month period, plaintiff-appellant had moved
a ten

month period.

On

four times within

In addition, she had had frequent changes of

jobs and had placed the minor
centers.

child

in

two

different

day care

(R. 58)
the

other

hand,

the

evaluator

noted

respondent had not had any changes of employment
stated

step-sibling, and

that

the

childfs

pediatrician

Dagin at a checkup towards the

end of
27

that defendantor residence and

had noted "a much calmer
summer.

The doctor would

not

draw

scientific

conclusions

from

suggested that perhaps the child was
living at
(R. 58)

what he had observed but

feeling secure

the time. At that time he was living with his father."

The evaluator also noted "although

been the

where he was

primary custodian

Laura has technically

of Dagin, it is not easy to determine

if she has been the constant primary caretaker." (R.58)
The evaluator then inquired

into

whether

Dagin,

the minor

child, was better off in a day care center or with his stepmother.
To that end, the evaluator noted the following:
At the day care center this evaluator asked if Dagin1s
teacher had ever asked the class to draw a picture of a
family.
They reported that they had and sent the
pictures home with their parents. At Laura's home the
picture was found, and she gave permission to this
evaluator to keep the picture for reference.
The
drawing includes four figures on one side of the paper
and a single figure on the other side of the paper.
Dagin identified a mom with four figures and a mom as a
single figure on the other side. He identified himself
in the figure of four.
Although we cannot draw
conclusions as to who he wants to live with from the
drawing, we can get a suggestion that Dagin has a
concept of family that includes four people. Included
in the picture were definitely a dad, a mom and Dagin
and one other figure. (R. 58)
The decision of the trial court awarding custody of the minor
child to

defendant-respondent was

supported by

the evidence and

testimony on the record, and it was "the trial court's prerogative
to hear and weigh the conflicting evidence and to make findings of
fact.

We will not upset such findings when they are supported by

substantial record evidence."
Contrary to the arguments

Kramer at 628.
of plaintiff-appellant,
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the trial

court did not make an award of custody to the stepmother.

Indeed,

a decision in the opposite result, if that analysis were followed,
would

lead

to

the

conclusion

that

an

award

of

custody

to

plaintiff-appellant would in fact be awarding custody of the minor
child to

a child care institution since plaintiff-appellant works

full-time.

Indeed, it

taking care

is

not

plaintiff-appellant

who

will be

of the child during the day, but the day care center.

Plaintiff-appellant's argument ignores

the

fact

that

the basis

upon which she claims discrimination is the exact basis upon which
she claims defendant-respondent should not be given custody of the
minor child, that being full-time employment.
Although

the

issue

of

employment was raised in regards to

time availability of each of the parties to
child, the

court based

its decision

spend with

on award

the minor

of custody on the

relative stability of the parties as articulated in Finding No. 12
of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows:
The court finds that the child should dwell in a stable
environment and that the defendant, petitioner herein,
can provide better stability and is in a better position
to take care of the minor child at the present time. (R.
196)
The court, having reviewed

the child

custody evaluation in

which it was noted that stability of environment
the overall

development of

and evidence regarding
job changes

a minor

is important for

child (R. 58), the testimony

plaintiff-appellant's

frequent

moves and

and the remarriage of defendant-respondent to a full29

time

homemaker,

the

court

could

properly find that defendant-

respondent had a greater stability in environment for
minor child,

and therefore

it was

in the

raising the

best interests of the

minor child for custody to be awarded to defendant-respondent.
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT SET AN
APPROPRIATE AMOUNT FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT TO PAY TO
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT AS CHILD SUPPORT.
Once the trial court had determined that defendant-respondent
should be

entitled to

set an appropriate

custody of the minor child, it should have

amount

in

child

support

to

be

payable to

defendant-respondent from plaintiff-appellant based on her earning
capacity.

Indeed, it was an

abuse

of

discretion

of

the trial

court not to do so.
Not

only

did

the

trial

court

fail

respondent an appropriate amount in child
appellant,

the

court

ordered

to

award defendant-

support from plaintiff-

defendant-respondent

plaintiff-appellant $250 a month for the three summer
she had

visitation with

the minor child.

pay

to

months that

In doing so, the court

failed to take into consideration that there would
out of

to

be nine months

the year in which plaintiff-appellant would have little or

no financial obligation for
expense for

the

minor

child,

since

the entire

the minor child would be born by defendant-respondent

during the nine months in which he would have custody.
plaintiff-appellant,

since

she

was

support, could save the amounts that
30

not

ordered

she should

to

Certainly,
pay child

have been paying

in child

support in

order to support herself and the minor child

during the three summer months visitation period.
VI.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FAILING TO TERMINATE THE PREVIOUS AWARD OF ALIMONY.
Although the trial court found that at the time of the decree
of divorce, plaintiff-appellant was

only

working

part-time, and

that at the present time, plaintiff-appellant had acquired a fulltime position and was making twice
did at

the time

the amount

of money

that she

of the decree of divorce, it failed to terminate

the alimony award given in the original decree of divorce

of $200

a month.
In

paragraph

11

of

the

court's

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law, it indicated that it was of the

"opinion that

alimony in this matter should not continue forever."

As such, the

court took a position
provide
status."

a

cushion

that the

to

award of

defendant

alimony was

merely "to

to return to a self-sustaining

Claus v. Claus, 727 P.2d 184 (Utah, 1986).

Since plaintiff-appellant
receptionist

for

a

law

was

firm,

defendant-respondent's assistance
terminated immediately.

now

she
and

working

was

no

alimony

full-time

longer
should

as a

in need of
have been

Indeed, it was an abuse of discretion for

the court's failure to do so.
VII. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED THE 1987 AND
1988 FEDERAL AND STATE INCOME TAX EXEMPTION FOR THE
MINOR CHILD TO DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
In entering its decision

that defendant-respondent
31

would be

entitled to

the 1987 and 1988 income tax exemptions for the minor

child, the court articulated that "he

will be

at the end of 1987 for the bulk for 1988."
When

further

questioned

by

in primary custody

(R. 321)

plaintiff-appellant's attorney

regarding his decision, Judge Park indicated:
...and so there is going to be a tax saving and I sort
of took that into consideration when I raised his child
support to $250 instead $150.
If we can create a
greater stream of income for that purpose, I think that
is what we ought to do. That is one of the reasons I
raised the child support for those three months or
whatever she elects to take during the summer. (R. 324)
Of particular note is the fact
the

payment

of

$250

summer months in which
with the

per

month

that the

trial court awarded

in child support for the three

plaintiff-appellant would

minor child.

have visitation

Subsequently, on the 9th day of February,

1988, this court ordered defendant-respondent to pay $250
in

support

from

November,

a month

1987 until final disposition of this

appeal.
Based on the fact that
from defendant-respondent
fact that he had
exemptions for

Judge

increased

child support

to appellant-plaintiff by virtue of the

awarded to
1987 and

Park

defendant-respondent the

income tax

1988 for the minor child of the parties,

Judge Park's decision in that regard should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff-appellant
Judicial

District

Court

has

failed

abused
32

its

to

show

that

the

Fourth

discretion when it awarded

custody

of

the

absence of

such a

Judge Park's
the

lower

minor

child

showing, this

prior rulings.

court

to

decision

court should

In
is

defendant-respondent.

In the

affirm and uphold

the event this court feels that

not

substantiated

by sufficient

findings, then defendant-respondent requests this court remand all
issues for further hearing.
DATED this

!(p day of March, 1988.

^

WAYNE^B. WATSON, P.C.
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
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